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CASE' NOTES
regardless of whether the shareholders vote to sue or not. It is beneficial
to distinguish between violations of statutes and violations of the funda-
mental "corporate compact" or in fraud of the rights of stockholders.
The need to grant minority stockholders the power unilaterally to in-
stitute suit contrary to a negative stockholders' vote would not be
so great when violation of a statute is the subject of the action, as it
would be when there is a breach or violation of the "corporate compact"
or a fraud on the rights of stockholders. Thus, a situation where a board
of directors surcharges the corporation would call for greater protection of
the minority stockholder than where the directors violate a federal statute,
if public policy is to be invoked in the interest of inhibiting dishonest conduct.
The court referred to Seigman v. Electrical Vehicle Co. as a leading
case representing the concept that a negative shareholders' vote will not
bar a derivative suit, adopting the view that a vote not to sue is in reality
an attempted ratification of an illegal act and is therefore unlawful. How-
ever, that case can be reconciled by application of the above distinction
between violations of statutes and violations of the "corporate compact"
or in fraud on the stockholders' rights. There the stockholders attempted to
"ratify the illegal act" by voting not to sue former directors who allegedly
declared dividends out of capital assets and not surplus assets. Such action
struck to the core of the corporate organization, denying the shareholders
their interest guaranteed by the corporate structure. Clearly, an illegal
alteration of the basic corporate structure calls for greater protection of
the minority shareholder than the decision not to exercise the corporation's
right to bring suit under a Federal statute. 18 A derivative suit based on
alleged violations of antitrust legislation need not be granted in the interest
of "public policy" to inhibit dishonest conduct by directors, as statutory
provisions for enforcement of those statutes serve that end.
KENNETH H. ZIMBLE
Fair Trade Laws—Requirement of Fair and Open Competition—Ad-
mission by Defendant in His Answer is Insufficient to Prove Fair and Open
Competition in the Gasoline Market.—Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays.1—Gulf Oil
Corporation brought a bill in equity against a gasoline retailer seeking to
enjoin him from selling Gulf gasoline below the minimum price established
in contracts between Gulf and other retailers pursuant to the Pennsylvania
18 "The fact that the bill calls for an inquiry into the illegality of the transaction
does not overcome the obstacle that ordinarily stockholders have no standing to inter-
fere with the management. Mere belief that the corporate action, taken or contemplated,
is illegal gives the stockholder no great right to interfere than is possessed by any other
citizen. Stockholders are not guardians of the public. The function of guarding the
public from acts deemed illegal rests with public officials." Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J.).
1 164 A.2d 656 (Penn. 1960).
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Fair Trade Law.2
 The defendant bad not signed any of these contracts
but since notice of their existence was received by him, he was required
by the statute to comply with their terms. 3
 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed a decree by the lower court enjoining defendant
from selling Gulf gasoline at less than stipulated prices. HELD: An admis-
sion by defendant in his answer, that plaintiff's products were in "fair and
open competition" throughout the state with gasoline of the same general
class produced by others, is insufficient to allow plaintiff to invoke the
Fair Trade Act without further evidence of such "fair and open competition."
Minimum resale price contracts pursuant to state Fair Trade Laws have
been the subject of much litigation in this country. The early opposition
to these contracts was based on a notion that they were contracts in restraint
of trade and thereby violated the federal antitrust laws. 4
 However, a series
of Supreme Court rulings and two "enabling" amendments to the antitrust
laws have resulted in federal approval of the state Fair Trade Statutes. 5
The individual states, on the other hand, are split on the question of
whether, in light of the provisions in state Constitutions, these minimum
resale price contracts can be enforced against retailers who have not signed
them.°
2
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 7-11 (1960).
3
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 8 (1960).
4
 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
5
 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936),
upheld the constitutionality of the Illinois Fair Trade Law on the theory that it permits
the protection of a property interest in the brand name or trade-mark; the Miller-
Tydings Amendment, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), expressly authorized
these minimum resale price contracts pursuant to state statutes, with regard to goods in
interstate commerce, if the products were in "free and open competition with commodi-
ties of the same general class produced by others"; the McGuire Amendment to the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. 45 (1958), specifically
authorized the application of these minimum resale price contracts to "non-signer"
retailers as well as to those who sign them. This statute has been construed and upheld
in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953).
The states holding their Fair Trade Statutes constitutional on the non-signer ques-
tion have followed the view of Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,
supra note 5. See: Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128
Conn. 596, 24 A.2d 841 (1942); General Electric Co. v. Klein, 34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A.2d
206 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v, G.E.M. Sundries Co., 43 Hawaii 103
(1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Kinsey Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost
Liquor Stores, Inc., 15 III. 2d 182, 154 N.E.2d 290 (1958) ; Goldsmith v. Mead John-
son & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939); General Electric Co. v. Kimball Jewelers,
Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956); W. A. Schaeffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209
Miss. 1, 45 So. 2d 652 (1950) ; Corning Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 161 A.2d 569
(N.H. 1960); Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d
304 (1954) ; General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802 (1954);
Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955) ; Miles Labora-
tories v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292 (1940); Standard Drug Co. v.
General Electric Co., 117 S,E.2d 289 (Va. 1960).
Those states invalidating the non-signer provisions have done so on three major
grounds: (1) That they are a violation of due process of law: Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp, v. White River Distributors, Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Olin
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In Pennsylvania, the jurisdiction in which the instant case was decided,
non-signer provisions have been held constitutional. 7 In the case of
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Schwartz,8 decided shortly before the present
case, the Pennsylvania court dissolved a preliminary injunction against a
non-signing gasoline retailer on the grounds that the plaintiff distributor
had not sufficiently shown the threat of irreparable harm or that its product
was in "fair and open competition" with other gasolines. However, in its
opinion, by way of dicta, the court stated that gasoline as a commodity was
within the protection of the Fair Trade Act" The same Pennsylvania court
in the instant case cast doubt on this dicta in Sinclair and opined that in the
light of the prevailing marketing practices of gasoline distributors there
would be grave constitutional problems connected with the imposition of
price-fixing contracts on non-signing retailers.m
The justification for the restriction placed on the non-signing retailer's
right to determine the price at which he will sell his gasoline is found in
the interest of a state in protecting the trade mark, brand or name of the
businessmen of the community." But, as the court in the instant case
Matheison Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); Cox v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955) ; Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v.
Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957) ; General Electric Co. v. American
Buyers Cooperative, 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958) ; Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v.
Schwegmann Bros. Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lipp-
man's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); McGraw
Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Skaggs
Drug Center v. General Electric Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957) ; Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958);
General Electric Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956) ; Rogers-Kent, Inc. v.
General Electric Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957) ; General Electric Co. v.
A. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1958). (2) That they are a denial
of equal protection of the laws: McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., supra;
General Electric Co. v. Wahle, supra. (3) That they are an unlawful delegation of
legislative power to private persons or groups: Olin Matheison Chemical Corp. v.
Francis, supra; Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., supra; Quality Oil Co. v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958) ; Dr. G. H. Tichenor
Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Mkts., supra; McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis &
Smith Drug Co., supra; Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 102 N.W.2d 528 (Minn.
1960).
7 Burche Co. v. General Electric Co., supra note 6.
8 398 Pa. 60, 157 A.2d 63 (1959).
9 Id. at 63, 157 A.2d at 64. The language in the Pennsylvania Fair Trade
Act construed to refer to gasoline is: "or the vending equipment from which the
commodity is sold to the consumer." This language obviously refers to a vending device
such as a gasoline pump.
10 Supra note 1, at 660.
11 In dealing with the due process objection to the non-signer clause of the Illinois
Fair Trade Law in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., supra
note 5, the United States Supreme Court stated (229 U.S. at 193):
" ... § 2 does not deal with the restriction upon the sale of the commodity
qua commodity, but with that restriction because the commodity is identified
by the trade-mark, brand or name of the producer or owner. The essence of
the statutory violation then consists not in the bare disposition of the com-
modity, but in a forbidden use of the trade-mark, brand or name in accona-
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pointed out:" (1) There is no danger of "loss leader" advertising" by
single-product retailers such as are here involved. (2) Moreover, in many
instances, there appears to be no protecting of the brand names of gasolines
because gasoline distributors very often replenish their shortages, remove
surpluses from the market, and cut transportation costs, by purchasing
fuel from other oil companies. This practice might result, for example, in
placing Shell gasoline in a Gulf pump. In such a situation, minimum resale
price contracts would be protecting only the price of gasoline rather than
the brand name of the distributor. 14
However, the court did not decide the case on the above issue but pre-
ferred to accomplish its objective by imposing on the plaintiff the almost
impossible burden of proving, by affirmative evidence, that its product is in
"fair and open competition" with gasoline of other producers, as required
by the Federal" and State" Fair Trade Legislation. This additional proof
was required in spite of both the defendant's admission in his answer that
plaintiff's products were in "fair and open competition" and also the
Chancellor's finding this to be a fact. The court justifies this seemingly
radical departure from appellate procedure'? by declaring that the State
has a parens patriae interest in seeing that unlawful price-fixing is not
indulged in by the major gasoline distributors.
The plaintiff, in the instant case, will encounter extreme difficulty in
proving that its product is in "fair and open competition" with other major
gasolines" due to the standard marketing procedure utilized by the gasoline
industry. The major gasolines are generally standardized and sell for
substantially identical prices in each market area, a phenomenon known as
"conscious parallelism." The price policies in each market area are generally
set by one of the major distributors and followed by the others." There
plishing such disposition. The primary aim of the Iaw is to protect the
property—namely, the good will—of the producer, which he still owns. The
price restriction is adopted as an appropriate means to that perfectly legit-
imate end, and not as an end in itself."
12 Supra note 1, at 660.
13
 Offering a product for sale at a price below cost in order to draw patrons into
the store. Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 621, 628 (1959).
14
 Supra note 1, at 660; see Note, Competition in Gasoline Retailing: A Price War,
101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 644, 660-62 (1953).
15
 Miller-Tydings Amendment, supra note 5; McGuire Amendment, supra note 5.
10 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 7 (1960).
17
 Supra note 1, at 662 (Dissent).
18 Id. at 660.
19 
"Most geographic market areas are dominated by a relatively small number
of large companies, with a fringe of independents. The majors compete in the
sale of an essentially standardized product. The product of the independents,
where available, enjoys less consumer acceptance, ordinarily finds a market
niche at a price differential, and does not, perhaps in most cases, disrupt the
pattern of leadership. Markets thus dominated are certainly less likely than
pure markets to be characterized by vigorous, continuous, and overt price
competition." Dirlam and Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in The Pricing of
Gasoline, 61 Vale L.J. 818, 825 (1952).
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is a definite lack of price competition in the industry among the major
distributors because they fear its destructive properties. 2° Consequently,
gasoline distributors concentrate on a type of "non-price competition" with
rivalries in advertising, service, and scientific developments. Or, they may
engage in "indirect price competition" where the distributor improves the
retailer's buildings and grounds without cost, or where tanks and pumps are
loaned or given as a gift to the retailer. Preferential rental agreements
are also included in the "indirect price competition" classification. 2 ' The
above practices, which are unique in the gasoline field, do not appear to
be the type of "fair and open competition" to which the statutes refer, in
light of the "follow the leader" price policies of the industry. "In short, the
intense competition, to which industry representatives so frequently allude,
is ... apparently of a limited, peripheral, exceptional character."22
Thus, the plaintiff in the instant case, is faced with a problem of proof
which appears insurmountable. The impact of this decision will be felt in
any future Fair Trade litigation in Pennsylvania by gasoline distributors.
The extraordinary evidentiary requirement would, in effect, defeat any suit
in this area ab initio. The court has taken a long step toward reading gasoline
as a commodity out of the protection afforded by the Pennsylvania Fair Trade
Law.
MORTON R. COVITZ
Labor Law—Discriminatory Hiring Arrangements—The Brown-Olds
Dues Reimbursement Remedy.—N.L.R.B. v. United States Steel Cor-
poration (American Bridge Division). 1—A complaint was issued by the
Board against an employer and a union on a charge brought by an employee
who claimed to have been discriminated against in hiring procedures. It
was found that the employer and union had observed the provisions of an
area-wide contract, which, in effect, gave the union indirectly almost com-
plete control over the hiring and discharge of employees at the employer's
plant. The hiring arrangement was declared unlawful because it limited
employment to union members in good standing. 2 The Board found both
20 Id. at 828: "Because of the threat of severe and destructive price competition
majors try to avoid direct and open price rivalry. . .. In any event, all members
of the industry feel the need to build a wall of insulation against the white heat of
so-called free competition.'"
21 Id. at 831.
22 Id. at 845.
1 278 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1960), petition for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court,
October Term, 1960.
2 Such hiring schemes have often been held illegal. N.L.R.B. v. Local 420, Plumbers,
239 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1956); N.L.R.B. v. Philadelphia Iron Works, 111 F.2d 937 (3d
Cir. 1954). By giving effect to such an agreement the employer violated i§ 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act (which make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to dis-
criminate in regard to hiring new employees or to use any illegal term or condition of
employment which would encourage or discourage membership in a labor union, which
419
